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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
BARRATRY-A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
RECENT BARRATRY STATUTES
As part of the policy of massive resistance to the school desegregation
case1 and other civil rights decisions, seven southern states have amended
their laws pertaining to barratry, champerty and maintenance.
2
COMMON LAW BARRATRY
At common law barratry was defined as the offense of frequently excit-
ing and stirring up quarrels and suits either at law or otherwise. 3 Mainte-
nance was assistance in a suit or action in which the assistant had no inter-
est of his own; champerty was maintenance plus an agreement to share the
subject matter of the suit if successful. 4 Barratry was habitual maintenance
with at least three offenses being required.5
Some or all of these definitions of barratry, champerty and maintenance
have been codified by the various states," and are quite adequate, since
prosecutions under barratry, champerty and maintenance statutes are rare
in the United States and England.7 The doctrines are now limited to inter-
1 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Ark. Laws 1958, No. 16, § 1-7; FLA. STAT. §§ 877.01-877.02 (1963); Ga. Laws 1957,
No. 514; Miss CODE ANN. §§ 2049.01-2049.07 (Supp. 1962); S.C. CODE §§ 16-521-16-523
(1962); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3405-39-3410 (Supp. 1964); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-388-
18.1-400 (1960).
3 Churchwell v. State, 195 Ga. 22, 26, 22 S.E.2d 824, 825 (1942). State v. Batson, 220
N.C. 411, 412, 17 S.E.2d 511, 512 (1941).
4 PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 449 (1957).
5 Churchwell v. State, supra note 3, at 23.
6 For example N.Y. PENAL LAW § 320 provides, "Common Barratry is the practice of
exciting groundless judicial proceedings."
§ 321, Common Barratry is a misdemeanor.
§ 322, No person can be convicted of common barratry except upon proof that he
has excited actions or legal proceedings in at least three instances, and with a corrupt
or malicious intent to vex and annoy. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, § 21 (1963) provides that
if any person wickedly and wilfully incites and stirs up any suits or quarrels with
a view to promote strife he is guilty of barratry. Punishment is set at a $100 fine and
attorneys may be suspended from practice for up to six months. § 22 provides that
anyone who officiously intermeddles in any suit that does not concern such person
by maintaining or assisting either party with money or otherwise to prosecute or defend
the suit with intent to promote the suit is guilty of maintenance. The fine is the same
as for barratry.
The statutes are aimed at the same conduct as were the common law offenses. The
laws against champerty, maintenance and barratry are primarily to prevent multitudi-
nous and useless suits as enterprises and speculation. Milk Dealer's Bottle Exchange v,
Schaffer, 224 11. App. 411, (1922).
7 Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 67 (1935).
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ference by a complete stranger to the litigation who is motivated by a
wrongful intent such as stirring up groundless litigation.
RECENT STATUTORY REVISIONS
Prior to 1956, the seven southern states followed the common law def-
initions of barratry, champerty and maintenance. Georgia defined com-
mon barratry as the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up suits and
quarrels between individuals."
Since 1956 the seven southern states have been utilizing their amended
barratry, champerty and maintenance laws as legal weapons to resist the
efforts of such organizations as N.A.A.C.P. and C.O.R.E. in initiating civil
rights suits.9
The recent statutory revisions in the South have taken the form of re-
defining and extending the criminal offenses of barratry, champerty and
maintenance. 10 The acts are quite similar in effect with some of the statutes
serving as the pattern for legislation in other states."
Virginia now has typical statutes defining barratry, champerty and
maintenance. Barratry is the offense of stirring up litigation which is de-
fined as instigating or attempting to instigate a person to institute a suit. In
order for the act to constitute instigation, all or part of the expenses of liti-
gation must be paid by the barrator. Such action does not amount to il-
legal instigation if the instigator is related by blood or marriage to the
plaintiff or is entitled by law to share with the plaintiff in the money or
property which is the subject of the litigation.12
The maintenance statute makes it unlawful for a person not having a
direct interest in the litigation to support with money or other assistance
any proceeding before a court or administ:ative agency against Virginia or
any of its agencies.'"
Thus, the Virginia maintenance statute has eliminated the requirement
that the offending party be engaged in stirring up litigation, because the
8 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-4701 (1953). See also ARK.. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-701-41-702 (1947).
9 Although the statutes do not mention N.A.A.C.P. or C.O.R.E. by name, it is ap-
parent that the acts are aimed at these organizations. In Scull v. Virginia ex rel Com-
mittee on Law Reform and Racial Activities, 351) U.S. 344, 346-347 (1959), Chairman
Thomson, while testifying in the course of the legislative battle over the barratry laws,
stated that "with this set of bills . . . we can bust that organization [N.A.A.C.P.] . . .
wide open."
10 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 1257, 1263 (1958).
11 E.g., the Tennessee statute. TENN. CODE A:'N. 99 39-3405-39-3410 (Supp. 1964)
is almost a verbatum imitation of the Virginia statute. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-388-18.1-
393 (1960).
12 VA. CODE ANN. 99 18.1-388-18.1-393 (1960).
13 VA. CODE ANN. §9 18.1-394-18.1-400 (1960).
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statute encompasses any arrangement where persons having no direct or
pecuniary interest contribute toward expenses of a lawsuit regardless of
whether or not such action stirs up litigation. In addition it is unlawful in
that state to give or receive money, goods or service to induce the institu-
tion of a suit against Virginia or advocate such a suit regardless of mo-
tive. 14
In addition, the common law requirement of frequently stirring up liti-
gation (a minimum of three such offenses) has been eliminated and one
such act would constitute the crime of barratry. 15 The apparent reason for
this is that the N.A.A.C.P. may institute just one action concerning civil
rights and prevail. This would not constitute barratry at common law
since it is not frequent stirring up of litigation.
The definition of "person" within the Virginia barratry statute has been
expanded to include person, firm, partnership, corporation, organization
or association.' 6 The purpose of this expanded concept of "person" is to
permit the state to prosecute for barratry such unincorporated organiza-
tions as the Virginia Branch of the N.A.A.C.P. Such prosecutions would
not be possible under the commonly accepted definition of person as a
natural being or a corporation.
Virginia has been the only southern state to amend its statutes concern-
ing running and capping.' The offense now includes procurement of legal
business for a corporation, partnership or association which compensates
attorneys serving in proceedings where the group has no direct interest. 18
14 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-394-18.1-400 (1960). In Virginia if the N.A.A.C.P. gave
an individual money to institute a suit and that person never commenced the suit, the
N.A.A.C.P. would still have violated the statute. To be guilty of maintenance in Illinois,
one must assist or give a party money to actually prosecute or defend a suit. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 13, § 22 (1963).
15 In New York three offenses are required to constitute barratry. N.Y. PENAL LAWS
§ 322. There have been no court rulings in Illinois as to whether three offenses are re-
quired in order to constitute barratry.
16 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-388 (1960). This definition of "person" has been adopted
by three other states. See Ark. Laws 1958, No. 16, § 1; MIss. CODE ANN. § 2049.01; S.C.
CODE § 16-523 (Supp. 1962).
17 At common law; a runner or caper was a person who acted as an agent for an
attorney in the solicitation or procurement of business. The Virginia statute expanded
this definition by including not only agents who solicit business for attorneys but
for any person, partnership, corporation or organization which retains any attorney
in connection with any judicial proceeding in which the person, partnership, corpo-
ration or organization is not a party and in which it has no pecuniary right or liability.
The N.A.A.C.P. retains attorneys on its legal staff. Members of the N.A.A.C.P. legal staff
explain the steps necessary to achieve desegregation to a meeting of a local N.A.A.C.P.
branch. The attorney then circulates printed forms authorizing N.A.A.C.P. attorneys
to represent the signers in legal proceedings. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 421
(1963). Thus the members of the N.A.A.C.P. would be guilty of soliciting legal business
for an organization.
18 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-78-54-79 (1960).
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The South Carolina barratry act is more limited in scope than the Vir-
ginia statute as there is a requirement of wilful solicitation or incitement
of another to prosecute an action and the barrator must seek employment
for himself or another to prosecute or defend the action.19
While the other states repeal prior inconsistent barratry acts, the South
Carolina statute provides that the act shaill not be construed as repealing
any existing statutes or common law.20 One possible explanation for this
unique arrangement is that civil rights advocates will be prosecuted under
the more stringent law while other violators will be punished under the
common law doctrine of barratry.
Arkansas includes within its definition of a barrator any person who
commits or proposes committing an act tending to breach the peace with
the intent that such an act will result in a suit. The definition is also ex-
tended to any person who seeks out and proposes to another that they sue
another person, Arkansas or the United States.2' Thus members of
N.A.A.C.P. who conduct a sit-in, in order to test the legality of a segrega-
tion statute would be guilty of barratry as they are committing an act tend-
ing to breach the peace with the intent that the act will result in a test case.
In addition, the statute would bar any class action, as the plaintiffs would
have to seek out and propose to each other that they bring such an action.
These two courses of conduct would never constitute the offense of bar-
ratry at common law. The Arkansas sta:ute is truly a powerful weapon
that can be used against those seeking to assert their civil rights.
In 1957 Georgia repealed its barratry statute and enacted a new law
which included a broadened definition of a barrator. 22 However this act
was repealed and the present statute provides that any person who fre-
quently incites and stirs up suits and quarrels is guilty of barratry. In ad-
dition attorneys or other persons are prohibited from offering money,
property or things of value as an inducement to institute any action or
proceeding. 23
19 S.C. CODE § 16-521 (1962). South Carolina directly punished the plaintiffs by pro-
viding that any person who wilfully prosecutes an action and who has no direct or
substantial interest or who receives anything of value to induce the bringing of the
suit is guilty of barratry.
20 S.C. CODE § 16-525.
21 Ark. Laws 1958, No. 16, 1 -7.
22 Ga. Laws 1957, No. 514. A barrator is defined as any person who frequently en-
gages in inciting and stirring up suits between individuals or between an individual and
the state. Any person who commits an act which tends to breach the peace with the
intention that such an act will result in litigation is also guilty of barratry. The act
of proposing to another that he sue any person or Georgia is also deemed barratry.
23 GA. CODE ANN. ch. 26-4701 (Supp. 1963).
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Mississippi and Florida have also modified their laws pertaining to bar-
ratry, champerty and maintenance. 24
SANCTIONS
In another deviation from the common law codes in the other states,
Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi and South Carolina now consider barratry,
champerty and maintenance as felonious. 25 The apparent reason for this is
that the legislators of these four states believed that stringent penalties
would deter the N.A.A.C.P. from instituting civil rights actions. Arkansas
and South Carolina have set the punishment for a conviction at a maximum
fine of $5,000 or a maximum jail sentence of two years, or both. In addi-
tion, a guilty corporation or organization is forever barred from doing
business in the state. Georgia provides for a jail sentence of from one to
three years or a fine not exceeding $5,000 or both. Mississippi provides for
a one-year jail sentence.
Florida, Tennessee and Virginia still consider the offenses of barratry,
champerty and maintenance as misdemeanors. However, Virginia and
Tennessee revoke the charters of guilty corporations. 26
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTES
As a result of the decision in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,27 the constitutional-
ity of the Southern barratry laws is doubtful. The gravamen of the deci-
sion is that the N.A.A.C.P. and its legal staff are modes of expression and
association which Virginia may not prohibit as improper solicitation of
legal business, despite its power to regulate the legal profession.28
24 FLA. STAT. §§ 877.01-877.02 (1963). The statute provides that whoever gives, prom-
ises, offers or conspires to do so, to any person, any valuable thing with the intent
to stir up litigation or with the intent of assisting or influencing the accused, sick,
injured or uninformed to sue or seek legal advice or service is guilty of barratry. Florida,
like the other six southern states, exempts contingent fee contracts, banks, trust com-
panies, and legal aid groups from the operation of barratry statutes.
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 2044.01-2049.01 (Supp. 1962). The statute makes it unlawful
for any person to promise, give, offer, or conspire to do so or to solicit, request or
donate anything of value to any person to commence or further prosecute any proceed-
ing. Upon a motion by one party, the opposing party must file an affidavit that he
has not received or conspired to receive any valuable consideration or assistance as
inducement to commence or further the suit.
25 Ark. Laws 1958, No. 16, § 2; GA. CODE ANN. ch. 26-4701 (1963); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 2049.02 (Supp. 1962); S.C. CODE § 16-524 (1962).
26 FLA. STAT. § 877.01 (1963); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39.3407 (Supp. 1964); VA. CoDE
ANN. § 18.1-390. Illinois provides for a $100 fine and a suspension from practice for up
to six months for attorneys found guilty of barratry. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, § 21 (1963).
27 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
28 This opinion coincides with the Opinion 148 of the American Bar Association,
Opinions of the Committee of Professional Ethics and Grievances. The National
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The Arkansas barratry statute was declored unconstitutional in the re-
cent decision of Bennet v. N.A.A.C.P.29 The Arkansas Supreme Court ob-
served that the language of the statute was so indefinite but so inclusive as
to acts that it impaired freedom of thought and action in relation to access
to the judiciary; the court recognized that our form of government guar-
antees uninhibited access to the judiciary3/°
In the only court test to date of the Mississippi statute, the plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment that the barratry statute was unconstitu-
tional. The court held that there was no evtidence of any threat to enforce
the act against the plaintiff.31 There is no record of any attempt to en-
force the statute in Mississippi.
CONCLUSION
There is a pragmatic reason for striking down these recent barratry
laws; if these laws are upheld, southern officials might well utilize them
in preventing N.A.A.C.P. and C.O.R.E. from instituting civil rights suits.
If this occurs the entire line of desegregation decisions will become mere
academic opinions.
It is therefore submitted that the recentl, enacted barratry statutes will
eventually be declared unconstitutional. It is apparent that these statutes
have been enacted for the sole purpose of eliminating or impeding a deluge
of civil rights litigation. No other jurisdiction has discovered any com-
pelling reason to expand their definitions of barratry, champerty and
maintenance.
The Illinois statute is apparently adequate since the present statute is
identical to the first Illinois barratry statute enacted in 1827.32 This is true
despite the tremendous amount of litigation in Illinois.33 Yet, the seven
southern states have radically changed their statutes. The inescapable
conclusion is that these states are attempting to punish those groups and
individuals who seek to obtain equal rights for all men.
Wayne Rhine
Lawyer's Committee of the American Liberty League was actively soliciting legal
business in order to test the constitutionality of New Deal Legislation. The A.B.A.
held that the question presented involved problems of political, social and economic
character that have long since assumed the propcrtion of national issues which tran-
scend the range of professional ethics.
29 370 S.W.2d 79 (Ark. 1963). 30 Id., at 82.
31 Darby v. Daniel, 168 F. Supp. 170 (1958).
3 2 REv. CODE OF LAWS OF ILL. § 104 (1827).
33 As of July, 1964, there were 108,536 cases pe:2ding in the Circuit Court of Cook
County. Supreme Court of Illinois Statistical Bulleiin Sept. 28, 1964, p. 1.
